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New evidence from corporate balance sheets
Laurent Maurin1 and Marcin Wolski1
1European Investment Bank∗
Abstract
Capitalising on the productivity decomposition proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), we
analyse the role of financial factors behind the relatively muted post-crisis rebound in pro-
ductivity compared to previous upturns in Europe. Firstly, we provide an OLS-consistent
framework to decompose sector-level productivity into trend and allocative efficiency compo-
nents. We then extend our approach to estimate the contribution of firm-level confounders
to the sector-level allocative component. Secondly, we find that financial leverage played
an important role in explaining the change in aggregate productivity growth in Europe be-
tween 2004 and 2017. Thirdly, focusing on Northern and Western Europe, we show that the
productivity potential could not be fully exploited due to access to credit conditions. Specif-
ically, reducing collateral bottlenecks could more than double the effectiveness of financial
leverage in spurring productivity growth in this region between 2014-17.
1 Introduction
From the perspective of aggregate production, it matters greatly whether the available resources
are employed in the firms that make the best use of them. To the contrary, longer-term economic
growth can be reduced when less productive firms lock in production factors which could have
been better deployed elsewhere (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). The
degree to which market activity is driven by highly productive firms is often recognized as
allocative efficiency, and it has been a focal point of the policy debate throughout the recent
decades (Banerjee and Duflo, 2019; Gopinath et al., 2017; Barbiero et al., 2020).
In their seminal paper, Olley and Pakes (1996) (hereafter OP) propose an elegant way to
express such-defined allocative efficiency, as a cross-sectional covariance-like term between the
firms’ market shares and respective productivity levels. Should highly-productive firms enjoy
large market shares, firms’ distribution would contribute positively to aggregate productivity
compared to a uniform distribution. Alternatively, should the market be dominated by low-
productivity entities, one can think of such an outcome as inefficient.
The OP framework has become an industry benchmark in empirical studies, as it offers
a simple, yet powerful, tool to analyse the micro-macro links in productivity. For instance,
∗Views presented in the paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of the
European Investment Bank (EIB).
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on the example of the US telecommunications equipment industry, OP show that deregulation
might have increased the covariance term by increasing the allocation of resources to the most
productive entities. More recently, Bartelsman et al. (2013) deliver evidence that variation
in the covariance term is a significant predictor of the cross-country differences in aggregate
productivity levels. On the European level, Eurostat (2016) estimates that if the OP allocative
efficiency among the EU manufacturing firms remained at the level from 2003 throughout the
following years, the production in that sector would have been by 6 per cent higher in 2014,
ceteris paribus. When taking into account market service firms, the gains would have been
around 24 per cent over the same period.
We take the OP framework as a starting point in our analysis. In particular, we propose
new methodology to estimate the OP covariance term within an Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
framework. We formally show that, after re-scaling the relevant variables, a re-weighted OLS
regression offers an simple and convenient technique to aggregate sector-specific OP results
across various data partitions. We further support the inference with bootstrap confidence
intervals, hence allowing for more meaningful comparison of productivity metrics across the
literature.
While the idea of estimating OP components on re-scaled variables is not a novelty (see, for
instance, Hyytinen et al. (2016)), we take it one step further and, still in the OLS framework, we
propose a formal approach to estimate the conditional OP covariance term. In particular, under
standard regularity conditions, our method allows to capture the distributional contribution of
firm-specific factors to the within-sector covariance productivity component. This constitutes
a major improvement over cross-sector or cross-country regressions, whereby the within-group
firms’ distributions are collapsed to the first moments only. Our method allows also to include
other firm-specific controls, reducing thereby the omitted variables bias.
We test our framework on a sample of EU manufacturing firms. We focus on labour pro-
ductivity metric, expressed as output per person employed, as it appears to suffer more from
the hysteresis effect than the Total Factor Productivity (TFP).1 Our main research question
concerns the degree to which the capital structure of the corporate ecosystem affected the al-
locative efficiency component, and consequently the aggregate productivity growth, in years
2004-17.
On this background, our study falls in the scope of the finance-productivity nexus. Access
to external finance is one of the key factors which allow innovative companies to enter the
markets and grow (Aghion et al., 2004; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). Similarly, properly
functioning financial markets should allow for orderly exit of less productive incumbents, and
smoothly reallocate resources to their most productive use (Aghion et al., 2019). The creative
destruction process may take longer than desired, from a welfare perspective, if it is blurred by
market frictions.
Agency problems, linked for instance to the corporate capital structure, are a point in
case. At excessive debt levels, managers can be discouraged from pursuing the most productive
investment projects and instead they can lock in the resources in less profitable endeavours
1It should be flagged, however, that our methodology can be applied to any input- or output-based productivity
metric, available at firm level.
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, problems with access to finance can also
lead firms to shift investment away from the most productive projects (Banerjee and Duflo,
2005). While our identification strategy cannot unambiguously answer whether the allocative
inefficiencies are related to too much or too little debt, we shed more light on the problem by
studying the relation between distribution of firms’ debt and the OP covariance component over
time, controlling for proxies of debt overhang and financial constraints.
Our results reveal a number of interesting patterns. Firstly, we confirm that the allocative
efficiency component contributed positively to the overall labour productivity growth through-
out the years. The contribution was the strongest during the crisis years, which could be
attributed to the cleansing effect of the recession (Duval et al., 2019), and the smallest in the
years following the crisis, as the firms took their time to adjust the production processes.
Secondly, we argue that corporate indebtedness could have a non-negligible effect on the
OP covariance productivity component. At the EU level, financial leverage contributed some
27% of the allocative productivity growth before the crisis and then collapsed during the crisis
period. In the after-crisis years the finance-driven allocative effiency growth was muted. While
it picked up marginally between in 2014-17, it never really recovered to the pre-crisis levels
with the contribution being nearly twice smaller at 14%. To put it in perspective, should
the financial leverage component in years 2014-17 grow at the pre-crisis levels, the covariance
productivity component in 2017 could have been higher by 0.76 per cent in Central-Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe, by 1.75 per cent in Southern Europe and by 6.67 per cent in Western
and Northern Europe.
Finally, we elaborate on the reasons for which the after-crisis covariance productivity growth
has been subdued. It seems that during the crisis years, the allocative productivity growth was
mostly hampered by the debt overhang problem, and after the crisis the productivity gains were
locked in by financial constraints, linked to the availability of collateral. For instance, should
the distribution of firm-level productivity be independent from collateral levels, debt could have
been more than twice more effective in spurring allocative efficiency growth across West and
North Europe between 2014-17.
The reminder of the paper consists of 5 sections. Section 2 motivates the study with a
brief overview of the recent literature. Section 3 offers an introduction to our methodological
approach with the main details and derivations laid out in the on-line Appendix. The empirical
design, focusing on the estimation of allocative efficiency, is depicted in Section 4. The role of
access to finance is investigated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivation
Long-run productivity growth has not been stable across developed economies. After the golden
years of solid growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), from the beginning of the twentieth
century to the end of the sixties, came almost 3 decades of stagnation (Gordon, 2016). In
particular, between 1920 and 1970 the annualized TFP growth in the US reached 1.89 per cent
per year, while between 1970 and 1995 it averaged to about a third of that, leveling at 0.57
per cent per year. After a couple of better-than-average years of TFP growth leading to the
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new millennium, the productivity again substantially reduced its dynamism in the recent years.
According to Gordon (2016), from 2004 until 2014 the productivity growth in the US average
to a mere 0.4 per cent per year. While the rates of growth picked up recently, they are still
substantially below the hefty years of the XX century.2
In Europe, even though the TFP has been on a trend decline since the late 90s is some
countries, the slowdown in productivity growth is predominantly visible in terms of labour
output (see Figure 1). On aggregate level, the TFP growth between 2014 and 2017 bounced
back to its pre-crisis years, amounting to an average 1 per cent per year. To the contrary, labour
productivity growth halved throughout the same period from 4 per cent per year in 2005-07 to
around 2 per cent in 2014-17.3
Productivity deceleration is much pronounced in the Central Eastern and Southern-Eastern
Europe (CESEE). To a large extent, it can be explained by the gradual catching-up process of
the region, as along the convergence with the rest of EU, the productivity gap diminishes and
productivity growth slows down. However, given the relatively small GDP share of the region
(of around 8%), the overall impact on the EU remains contained. Figure 1(b) confirms that the
drop in labour productivity growth rates is consistently observed throughout the EU regions.
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(b) Labour productivity
Notes: Labour productivity calculated as GDP per person employed. Authors’ computations based on European
Commission and Eurostat. See notes to Table 1 for the composition of the regions.
As productivity growth raises aggregate production levels, it is no surprise that it has been
a focal element of both theoretical and empirical research. While there is no single answer
pointing to one specific bottleneck to unlock productivity growth potential, a number of possible
explanations have been put forward.
2Some research suggests that the impact of the digital sector on economic activity is underestimated in national
accounts. Some estimates for the US indicate that growth could have been up to 0.15 p.p. each year since 2005
(Nakamura et al., 2017).
3On this background, labour productivity becomes our key variable of interest throughout the empirical part
of this study.
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2.1 Productivity and misallocation
A strand of research claims that resource misallocation is responsible for the disappointing
overall post-crisis economic performance. The OP decomposition is one of the key frameworks
to support the policy debate in this respect. In essence, OP measures the gains or losses in
aggregate productivity relative to a situation where market shares are distributed randomly
across firms within a certain sector. A positive OP covariance-like term, suggests that the
resources are being allocated efficiently, as firms with relatively high productivity levels have
also higher market shares.
On the basis of the OP metric, a large-scale study requested by the European Commission
and delivered by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Valencian Institute
of Economic Research, and the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, reveals that that
reallocation of resources plays an important part in explaining cross-country differences in the
levels of productivity on a sample of 21 EU countries (Eurostat, 2016). The report finds that,
on average, allocative efficiency has seen a small decrease in the post-crisis years. Yet, there are
substantial differences between industries, with manufacturing characterized by lower levels of
allocative efficiency than, for instance, the services sector.
An alternative measure of allocative efficiency draws on the seminal work of Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), who take the view that productivity dispersion reflects a deviation from the
competitive equilibrium and as such it is an implication of resource misallocation. Gorod-
nichenko et al. (2018) propose a simple theoretical framework, linking the dispersion in marginal
products of capital and labour to efficient allocation of resources. Under perfect allocation, the
marginal products should be equal across firms operating in the same sectors. High dispersion
can be related to distortions to the production sector and whether resources flow to the most
productive investment projects. The authors argue that rising misallocation of resources in
European countries could be one of the culprits to the productivity slowdown.
Borio et al. (2015) emphasize the role of misallocation of labour during the pre-crisis financial
boom and the long shadow it has cast post-crisis. The authors develop an empirical analysis
covering more than 20 advanced economies over 40 years. Their analysis suggests that resource
misallocation can be a consequence of a major financial boom and bust cycle, and it can be
present years after the economy rebounds.4
The OP framework, and the marginal product dispersion, are effectively two sides of the
same coin and describe the static case of within-sector distribution of resources. The most recent
literature proposes that a part, at least, of the productivity dispersion could also reflect an
equilibrium. For example, David et al. (2018) show that dispersion in static marginal products
of capital is linked to systematic investment risks. As firms can differ in their exposure to these
risks, firm-level risk premia are not identical and productivity is not necessarily equalized within
sector.
Even though the above methods do not account for the dynamic process of entry and
exit of firms, but treat all firms as incumbents instead, life in the corporate ecosystem is yet
another important contributor to productivity growth. Indeed, building on the work of Foster
et al. (2001), Andrews et al. (2016) show that the productivity slowdown results from the
4This is sometimes referred to as the hysteresis effect.
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deterioration in the two fundamental microeconomic forces, i.e. (i) a noticeable decline in the
pace the laggard firms catch up with the global productivity frontier, and (ii) a reduction
in the extent of corporate exit-entry dynamism and its productivity-enhancing effect. More
recently, Melitz and Polanec (2015) extend the OP decomposition for the entry-exit dynamics,
which constitutes a major step to better understand the reasons behind the slowdown in the
allocative efficiency growth. For instance, on the example of Slovenian manufacturing firms,
they estimate that the measurement bias associated with entry and exit accounts for up to 10
percentage points of aggregate productivity growth.
2.2 The role of exit and entry in the corporate ecosystem
New firms offer an important way for new products and new production methods to be intro-
duced into markets and can drive out less efficient production techniques. New firms can also
spur incumbent firms to improve productivity, in an attempt to survive (Aghion et al., 2004).
Reflecting the productivity trends cited at the beginning of Section 2, Decker et al. (2014)
show that the US economy has recorded a trend towards concentration and less entries in the
corporate ecosystem over the last three decades. The percentage of employment at firms with
less than 100 employees has fallen from 40 to 35% and the annual rate of enterprise creation has
decreased from 13 to less than 8 per cent.5 In parallel, the share of employment by young firms
(less than 5 years) has decreased from 18 to 8%, while that by large large firms has increased,
from one-quarter in the 1980s to about one-third in 2010.
Focusing on the EU economy, Figure 2 plots the entry and exit rate in the corporate ecosys-
tem, over the recent years. Net entry follows a cyclical cycle and it has been, on average,
positive over the last years. Net entry is observed to be higher during periods of upswing, such
as since the beginning of 2013, and lower during downturns, such as during the sovereign debt
crisis. This cyclical pattern is mostly driven by changes in entry rates as it appears that exits
have not increased significantly during the crisis.
The absence of a cyclical pattern in the exit rate may suggest that that firms which could
have exited the market, received an extra lifeline at the expense of lower aggregate productivity
levels. Such a lifeline has been visible, for instance, through the roll-over of bank loans, even
for incumbent firms without bright market prospects. This phenomenon is often dubbed as
ever-greening (Peek and Rosengren, 2005).6
This seems at odds with the normal cyclical behaviour of cleansing, whereby recessions
enable weaker firms to exit the market, thereby freeing resources for the rest of the economy
and enabling these resources to move to the most productive firms. When the banking sector
is relatively weak and encumbered with impaired assets, it is slow to recognize the losses. As a
consequence, the incentives for ever-greening go up, locking in banking capital which could have
been used more productively otherwise (Gropp et al., 2018; Andrews and Petroulakis, 2019).
5To avoid confusion, unless stated otherwise, throughout the text we use % symbol to describe shares, and
‘per cent’ formulation to describe changes like, for instance, growth rates.
6We borrow this term from Peek and Rosengren (2005), even though it was originally coined to describe the
situation among Japanese banks.
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2.3 Access to finance as an indirect contributor
A vast body of literature point to the conclusion that better access to credit should have an
unambiguously positive effect on productivity and economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Companies which are credit-rationed may not pursue the most productive investment projects
if they do not have access to the necessary funding. In parallel, firms with abundant and cheap
financing may find it profitable to engage in projects which would have not been profitable
otherwise. The ability to channel the resources to highly productive projects may be then
distorted by the allocation of corporate credit, financial incentives and ability of financial sector
to screen and monitor investment projects. Weak banking sector can exacerbate these elements.
Access to finance matters for innovation too. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) show
that a firm’s decision to invest into innovative activities is sensitive to financial frictions, which
can prevent firms from adopting better technologies. On a sample of firms from Eastern Europe
and Commonwealth of Independent States, they find evidence that costly external funding may
significantly hamper convergence to the technological frontier.
The recent studies show, however, that the link between credit access and productivity
growth may be non-monotonic. Aghion et al. (2019) show the existence of two counteracting
effects of access to credit on productivity growth. On the one hand, better access to credit
makes it easier for entrepreneurs to innovate. On the other hand, the authors argue, that
excessively easy access to credit can be a drag on productivity. This is because better credit
access allows less efficient incumbent firms to remain longer on the market, thereby discouraging
entry of new and potentially more efficient innovators. Overall, the link between credit access
and productivity growth may look like an inverted U-shape. Productivity is an increasing
function of credit conditions when credit is rationed. Beyond a certain threshold, however, the
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relationship becomes inverted, as access to credit becomes too loose and it becomes associated
with ever-greening or misallocation, and becomes detrimental to productivity growth.
Duval et al. (2019) argue that after the global financial crisis, the interplay between tighter
credit conditions and weak corporate balance sheets generated a productivity hysteresis effect,
playing an important role in the post-crisis productivity slowdown in advanced economies. They
further deliver evidence that more restrictive access to credit led vulnerable firms to cut back
on intangible investment expenditure, hence reducing innovation.
Itskhoki and Moll (2019) demonstrate that in the presence of financial frictions, in the form
of a collateral constraint, highly productive entrepreneurs cannot expand their capital. This, in
fact, limits their ability to compete in the product market and consequently the low-productivity
firms rip of the excess returns on their products, weighing down on the aggregate productivity.
Gopinath et al. (2017) find significant trends in the loss in TFP due to misallocation of
resources in Italy and Portugal, but do not find such trends in Germany, France, and Norway.
This signals that misallocation can be associated with country-wide credit market conditions,
as firms in Southern Europe are likely to operate in less-developed financial markets. Having
pointed this out, the authors illustrate how the decline in the real interest rate has led to
a significant decline in sectoral total factor productivity. This was a consequence of capital
inflows being misallocated toward firms that had higher net worth but were not necessarily
more productive.
This conclusion is reiterated by Borio et al. (2015), who decompose sector-wide productivity
into an OP-like common and an allocation component. The authors show that while allocation
element does not explain much of the variation in the overall productivity, it is negatively
affected by a flattening of the yield curve. It is linked to the fact that investment is financed
at long-term rates. Higher rates result in lower investment such that resources are relocated to
the higher productivity sectors, improving the overall resource allocation.
Firm-level capital structure may be another important channel through which macro-financial
conditions translate into investment decisions and by extrapolation can influence the productiv-
ity levels. Barbiero et al. (2020) show that at higher levels of indebtedness firms which operate
in high-growth sectors invest relatively more than otherwise identical firms with less debt. These
positive effects disappear, however, if firms’ debt is already excessive, if it is dominated by short
maturities, and during systemic banking crises.
Theoretical foundations of our study reach back to the arguments proposed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Fuchs et al. (2016) and Barbiero et al. (2020), whereby agency problems
between managers and shareholders, and between firms and investors, can lead firms to shift
investment away from the most productive projects available and therefore reduce the aggregate
productivity levels over time. More precisely, we measure to what extent the relation between
firm-level capital structure, and the OP allocative efficiency component, changed over the first
two decades of this century in the EU.
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3 Analytical framework
Our methodological approach capitalizes on the aggregate productivity decomposition proposed
by Olley and Pakes (1996), OP hereafter. It is developed in three steps.7 In the first step, we
consider a very simplified economy consisting only of one sector at a given time (Section 3.1). In
the second step, we generalize our methodology to a multi-sector economy (Section 3.2). In the
third step, we focus on the drivers of the efficiency component of the OP equation (Section 3.3).
More specifically, we propose to estimate the relevance of the confounding variables to the level
of efficiency component by using the law of total covariance.
Our procedure relies on the analogy principle, whereby population conditional covariance
parameters can be estimated by the corresponding sample statistics. As we operate in the OLS
world, the framework requires that all Gauss-Markov assumptions hold. In this respect, the
strict exogeneity assumption is particularly relevant for proper identification of the contribution
to the covariance term, as it guarantees its unbiasedness. Importantly, we propose to control for
other observable firm-specific factors when estimating the contribution, which should reduce the
omitted variable bias and soften the identification assumption to conditional strict exogeneity.
3.1 A one-sector approach
Let us denote the aggregate productivity level in industry s by Ψs. The specific productivity
metric depends on the application, and it can represent either an industry level index of TFP or
labour productivity, in levels or in log-units, computed by using either input or output shares.
The OP decomposition rewrites aggregate productivity in terms of the unweighted and weighted
components as:






(wis − w̄s) , (1)
where ψ̄s = 1/ns
∑ns
i=1 ψis is the unweighted average productivity level, wis is the within-sector
market share of firm i, and w̄s is the mean market share. By definition, the market shares
of each firm operating in a specific sectors are positive and they add up to 1.8 Within-sector
number of firms is given by ns, and we consider only meaningful cases where ns ≥ 2. Firm-level
productivity is represented by ψis.
The OP covariance-like term indicates by how much productivity is modified compared to
uniform distribution where each firm has the same market share (a benchmark case reflected in
ψ̄s). The component is positive, raising productivity, when stronger-productivity firms have a
higher market share. Conversely, it is negative, reducing the overall productivity in the sector,
when low productivity firms tend to have higher market shares.
To build a link to the OLS regression, we observe that, using the sample covariance estimates,
7The presentation of the paper is rather simplified to the basic logic behind the mathematical formulas in the
main body of the paper, but the formal proofs and generalizations are available in the on-line Appendix.
8While the decomposition from Eq. (1) was extended by a time dimension (see, for instance, Melitz and
Polanec (2015)), there is no clear-cut regression representation of such dynamic specification. Hence, we focus
here on static estimates for time t and leave the dynamic representation for future investigations.
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(wis − w̄s) = (ns − 1)cov(ψs, ws), (2)
where cov stands for covariance. It follows that the OLS estimate β̂1 from a simple linear model
ψ = β0 +β1w+ ε, is a re-scaled Right Hand Side (RHS) of Eq. (2). Skipping the subscripts, the
basic OLS transformation identifies that β̂1 = cov(ψ,w)/var(w), where var(w) is the variance
of w.
Consequently, the covariance misallocation estimate can be calculated by fitting the OLS
regression on re-scaled variables ψ′ ≡ f(ψ) and w̃ ≡ g(w). The key transformation is the
standarization of w to its standard score w̃, with var(w̃) = 1. To balance the effects on the
dependent variable, in the second transformation we set ψ′ = ψ(n − 1)σw, where σw is the
standard deviation of w.
Estimating the regression on the re-scaled variables ψ′ = β0 + β1w̃ + ε, one may find that
β̂1 = (n− 1)cov(ψ,w), which is equivalent to the RHS of Eq. (2). The formal demonstration of
the argument is given in Proposition 1 in the online Appendix.
It should be noted that there are multiple ways to re-scale the variables and still get the same
regression results. Hyytinen et al. (2016), for instance, propose a GMM estimation framework
where they re-scale the market share variable only as (wi− w̄)/σ2wn. The re-scaling methods are
clearly interchangeable, and our further arguments can be aligned to match the one of Hyytinen
et al. (2016). Ultimately, the choice of the re-scaling method depends on individual preferences.
In our case, the w̃ variable is a standard score, which is often an already implemented transfor-
mation in statistical software and thereby remains our preferred specification.
3.2 Generalisation to several sectors
Let us assume that the economy consist of S sectors, indexed as s = 1, ..., S with S ≥ 2.10 By
the law of total expectations, Eq. (2) can be aggregated at the general economy level as:
E [(nS − 1)cov(ψS , wS)|S] =
∑
s
(ns − 1)cov(ψs, ws)πs, (3)
where πs determines the across-sector market share weights that add up to 1.
As Eq. (3) is linear between sectors, the OLS strategy developed in Section 3.1 can be
extended to cover multiple sectors provided that (i) ψ′ and w̃ are standardized by sector and
(ii) the regression is re-weighted by a combination of πs and the inverse sample weights n/(ns−
1), where ns is the number of firms in sector s and n is the total number of firms. It can
be verified that the estimates from the weighted OLS on the re-scaled variables on the full
sample, correspond to the outcome when estimating the covariance productivity by sector and
calculating their weighted average. The procedure is formalized in Proposition 2 in the on-line
Appendix.
9For the population covariance, the multiplier becomes ns instead of ns − 1. We apply the Bessel’s correction
in line with the majority of OLS software implementations.
10While in our exposition, the decomposition of the economy is based on sectors of activity, it does have not
to. A data cut can also reflect a geography, legal type, size, R&D content, etc.
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Eqs. (2) and (3) offer an elegant and efficient framework to track the OP covariance pro-
ductivity across multiple sectors. One should note that the original variation for the covariance
component comes only from within-sector firm characteristics such that the β̂1 OLS-weighted
estimate is a weighted sum of sector-specific allocative efficiency scores. The population weights
can be chosen to correct for under/over-representation of particular sectors in data sets.11
A direct benefit of applying the OLS framework to the OP decomposition is related to the
inference. If the standarization of ψ and w were deterministic, OLS estimates could have been
estimated consistently under the Gauss–Markov assumptions. In practice, however, both ψ′
and w̃ are stochastic as σw is itself an estimate. While it is possible to derive a closed-form
asymptotics for such a basic example, due to complexities of the next steps, in our applications
we will rely on bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Under a reasonable assumption that the variables in question have finite first and second
moments, β̂1 from the weighted OLS regression is asymptotically tight. We propose a stratified
bootstrap approach, where for each bootstrap replica b we re-sample firms (with replacement)
per sector and estimate the corresponding β̂b1. Standard errors and confidence intervals are
calculated over the bootstrapped results β̂11 , ..., β̂
B
1 , where B is the total number of replicas.
3.3 Estimating the relevance of confounding factors
For transparency, we revert to a single-sector setup to introduce conditional elements in the OP
decomposition. Suppose that there is a confounding variable Z with realizations z, observed
at a firm level. For simplicity, take that Z is one dimensional, however Proposition 3 in the
Appendix allows for dZ-dimensional setups, dZ ≥ 1. By the law of total covariance, we arrive
at:
cov(ψs, ws) = E [cov(ψs, ws|Z)] + cov(E[ψs|Z],E[ws|Z]). (4)
The first element in the decomposition is the average covariance term when controlling for
confounder Z at the firm level. It informs what would have been the level of covariance had
the within-sector variation in Z been removed. The second term depicts the contribution of
confounder Z to the overall covariance level, through relation with both ψ and w variables.
While the first term in Eq. (4) does not have a direct plug-in estimate, under taking
the linear representation as the first-best approximation, the second term can be estimated
on corresponding sample fitted values, by the analogy principle. More precisely, let us take
E[ψi|zi] ≡ ψ̂i = α̂0+α̂1zi and E[wi|zi] ≡ ŵi = β̂0+β̂1zi, where both α and β parameters are fitted
on the respective models using the OLS framework. It follows that cov(ψ̂s, ŵs) = α̂1β̂1var(Zs).
We propose the following estimation framework to match the desired magnitude of the coeffi-
cients:
11While it is not the direct element of further analysis, the unweighted average component from the OP
decomposition in Eq. (1) can also be extracted through the OLS framework but with a modest modification. In
particular, the term ψ̄s is equivalent a constant from a re-weighted regression ψis = β0 + β1w̃is + εis. As the
constant term aggregation does not involve the Bessel’s correction, the weights in the weighted OLS should equal
the product of population weights πs and uncorrected inverse sample weights n/ns. Since our primary objective
is to study the covariance metric, we leave it out from the proposition.
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ψ′′is = α0 + α1z̃is + νis,
w′′is = β0 + β1z̃is + εis,
(5)
where ψ′′is = ψis
√
ns − 1, w′′is = wis
√
ns − 1 and z̃is is the standard score of Z in sector s. In
effect, (ns − 1)cov(ψ̂s, ŵs) = α̂1β̂1. For correct magnitude identification, we require that the
strict exogeneity assumption holds for both regressions, such that E[ν|Z̃] = 0 and E[ε|Z̃] = 0,
making α̂ and β̂ estimates unbiased.
At this stage it is worth noting, that the setup has its identification limits when dZ ≥ 2.
Even if the confounders were mutually independent, the marginal contribution of confounders
Z1, ..., ZdZ can only be identified jointly as a sum of product of respective coefficients, i.e. α̂11β̂
1
1+
... + α̂dZdZ β̂
dZ
dZ
. It is due to the fact that the magnitude of the remainder terms in multivariate
extension of Eq. (4) depends on the order of conditioning variables.
Despite the limits when considering a large number of covariates, the setup has an interesting
property that allows to single out the effects of specific covariates, controlling for other firm-
level characteristics. Let us reformulate the original question in the way that we’re interested
in measuring the impact of a confounding variable Z on the OP covariance productivity level,
controlling for a vector of observable variables Q, dQ ≥ 1. This question translates into the
conditional covariance decomposition as:
cov(ψs, ws|Q = q) = E [cov(ψs, ws|Q = q, Z)] + cov(E[ψs|Q = q, Z],E[ws|Q = q, Z]). (6)
We propose to fit the following linear models:
ψ′′is = α0 + α1z̃is + γ1q̃
1
is + ...+ γdQ q̃
dQ
is + νis,
w′′is = β0 + β1z̃is + δ1q̃
1




where variables ψ′′is, w
′′
is and z̃is are as above, and we use a standard scores for Q variables
denoted by q̃1is through q̃
dQ
is to match the scale of Z variable. As realizations q enter into Eq. (7)
as fixed, it follows that (ns − 1)cov(ψ̂s|Q = q, ŵs|Q = q) = α̂1β̂1. This specification allows to
weaken the strict exogeneity condition to E[ν|Z̃, Q̃] = 0 and E[ε|Z̃, Q̃] = 0.
We note that the decompositions in Eq. (4) and in Eq. (6) happen within sector, hence
similar aggregation strategy as in Section 3.2 can be applied to cover multiple sectors. The
formalization of the procedure can be found in Propositions 4 and 5 in the online Appendix.
Similarly, the standard errors for the product of the coefficients can be obtained with a stratified
bootstrap approach.
4 Estimating allocative efficiency
We now take the proposed methodology to the data. We begin by a brief description of our
sample data of European corporates, and comparing them against basic summary statistics
officially reported by the Eurostat. In the analysis, we pay particular attention to geographical
breakdown, distinguishing between the three main regions, i.e. Western and Northern Europe,
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Southern Europe and Central, Eastern and Southern Eastern Europe (CESEE).12 The sectoral
granularity covers the representative group of 228 4-digit manufacturing sectors, according to
the Nace Rev. 2 classification.
We estimate the OP decomposition, i.e. the trend and covariance productivity components,
for each year from 2004 until 2017. Our core metric concerns the labour productivity, defined
as value added per person employed. Following the strategy proposed in Section 3, we estimate
the OP decomposition on productivity levels. We then compute the growth rates and report
the results on them in the main text. Results on the levels are reported in the Appendix.
Last but not least, we estimate the role of capital structure at the firm-level to economy-
wide covariance productivity component, controlling for several observable factors. There are
multiple potential candidate variables to consider when thinking about capital composition. In
the current setup, we follow the strategy proposed by Barbiero et al. (2020), and in the main
specification we focus on the financial leverage, defined as a ratio of total debt to total assets.
As a robustness check we extend the specification to the net financial leverage, defined as a
ratio of total debt minus cash holdings to total assets.
4.1 Data
We use firm-level information included in the ORBIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk
(BvD). The database contains firm-level financial statements and ownership data, gathered
and standardized to the so-called ‘global format’, being comparable across jurisdictions. Our
database updates come semi-annually in vintages, where each vintage is cleaned up from com-
panies which haven’t reported any information for 10 years or more. Therefore, to correct for
the survivorship bias, we aggregate the data for all the vintages to obtain a sample covering 14
years, from 2004 until 2017.
We select corporates from all EU28 countries and consider unconsolidated accounts. As the
within-sector coverage is key in our identification strategy, we look into the Manufacturing sector
only (Section C according to the Nace Rev. 2 classification), as having the most representative
coverage (Gopinath et al., 2017). Our main grid of interest is composed of 228 4-digit sectors
(from the total pot of 230 4-digit sectors reported by Eurostat). We don’t put any ex-ante size
thresholds on the firms in the sample.
In the data-cleaning procedure, we exclude observations with odd or inconsistent values in
the spirit of Barbiero et al. (2020). We drop firm-year observations in which total assets, fixed
assets, intangible fixed assets, sales, long-term debt, loans, creditors, debtors, other current
liabilities, or total shareholder funds and liabilities have negative values. We then check for
the reporting consistency and drop the firm-year financial statements which violate the basic
balance-sheet equivalences by more than 10%. Specifically, we impose that (i) total assets
match total liabilities, (ii) total assets match the sum of fixed assets and current assets, and
(iii) current liabilities match the sum of loans, trade credit and other current liabilities. We
also deflate variables using the country-specific Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
deflators. All data are winsorized at 1% level.
To limit potential composition bias and to guarantee sufficient statistical power at the
12For exact country coverage please refer to the notes to Table 1.
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country-sector level, we focus only on sectors which have at least 30 firms in every year from
2004 until 2017 at the country 4-digit level. While this step results in a dropout of around 18%
of all observations (20% of firms), it improves the comparability of the results across years and
it is less susceptible to sudden swings in the reported number of firms per sector.
Our main variables of interest include the Value Added (VA) market share and labour
productivity. The former is calculated based on the reported added value in the corporate
accounts. If it is not given explicitly, we fit it either by the sum of employee cost and EBITDA,
or by the difference between turnover/sales and material costs. To reflect the sectoral grid, the
VA market shares are calculated based on 4-digit sector codes. Labour productivity is obtained
as the ratio between value added and the number of people employed in a firm.
Finally, to improve the representativeness of the sample, we exclude the countries for which
the average sector coverage is below 10% of the active population of enterprises as reported
by the Structural Business Statistics in Eurostat. While this leaves out Poland and Germany,
for instance, the data attrition is small (around 1% in terms of number of observations, and
roughly 2% in terms of the number of firms).
Overall, we work with a data set covering 17 EU countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We work with an unbalanced panel of 671,818
unique firms over the years 2004-17, which gives a total of 4,397,353 firm-year observations.
Using a 4-digit decomposition of manufacturing, we cover 228 sectors. The basic summary
statistics for the manufacturing sector for the whole area considered and the three main regions
is given in Table 1.
Several stylised facts appear. Firstly, more than half of the observations in the analysis
come from South European countries. This is not a surprise given a relatively broader ORBIS
coverage for these countries (Barbiero et al., 2020). Nevertheless, the number of observations
in the CESEE region, as well as in Western and Northern Europe, reaches nearly 1 million in
each case. We believe this is enough to provide a meaningful comparison benchmarks for the
analysis, yet we take a closer look at the data representativeness later in this section.
Secondly, labour productivity appears to be the highest in Western and Northern Europe at
around 60,000 euros per year, followed by the Southern Europe with almost 41,000 euros and
finally the CESEE region with around 13,000 euros. These patterns are fully consistent with
the productivity metrics reported throughout the literature and measured from macroeconomics
aggregates (Eurostat, 2016). Importantly, labour productivity shows a fair degree of variation
for each of the regions.
Thirdly, firms located in Western and Northern Europe tend to be bigger on average, both
in terms of total assets and the number of employees. Firms with the lowest average number of
employees are located in Southern Europe, while the CESEE region is relatively more populated
with the smallest firms in terms of asset size.
Fourthly, there are important differences related to firms’ indebtedness. The highest debt
to assets ratio can be found in Southern Europe at the average level of 68%. CESEE countries,
as well as Western and Northern European countries have lower leverage ratios, each reaching
62%. Looking at the maturity composition of debt, short-term debt rather dominates in the
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Table 1: Basic summary statistics.
Full sample
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Lab. productivity 4,397,353 39,647.77 32,484.50 35,077.79 609.00 245,167.00
Employment 4,397,353 23.95 7.00 52.14 1.00 375.00
Total assets (log) 4,393,137 13.22 13.17 1.99 6.69 19.01
Debt/Assets 3,500,531 0.66 0.64 0.37 0.00 4.07
Long debt/Assets 3,605,938 0.12 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.95
Sales/Assets 4,186,967 1.51 1.23 1.25 0.03 13.00
Cash/Assets 4,229,482 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.99
Fixed assets/Assets 4,390,817 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.97
Tan. assets/Assets 4,336,089 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.00 0.97
CESEE
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Lab. productivity 853,723 12,541.61 7,511.00 14,812.29 609.00 91,103.29
Employment 853,723 26.85 6.00 60.57 1.00 375.00
Total assets (log) 850,040 11.79 11.76 2.12 6.69 17.07
Debt/Assets 482,937 0.62 0.53 0.58 0.00 4.07
Long debt/Assets 567,100 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.72
Sales/Assets 849,617 1.87 1.34 1.96 0.03 13.00
Cash/Assets 820,521 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.99
Fixed assets/Assets 849,194 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.97
Tan. assets/Assets 844,151 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.97
Southern Europe
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Lab. productivity 2,547,468 40,961.91 33,357.90 33,135.47 1,695.50 204,981.17
Employment 2,547,468 19.20 8.00 37.71 1.00 271.00
Total assets (log) 2,547,022 13.56 13.47 1.73 9.70 18.13
Debt/Assets 2,119,092 0.68 0.68 0.33 0.08 2.24
Long debt/Assets 2,132,542 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.95
Sales/Assets 2,540,088 1.27 1.10 0.89 0.06 5.32
Cash/Assets 2,463,793 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.73
Fixed assets/Assets 2,546,151 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.91
Tan. assets/Assets 2,507,850 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.00 0.86
West and North Europe
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Lab. productivity 996,162 59,517.45 50,885.00 37,507.98 7,899.00 245,167.00
Employment 996,162 33.64 7.00 71.13 1.00 375.00
Total assets (log) 996,075 13.59 13.31 1.93 9.88 19.01
Debt/Assets 898,502 0.62 0.60 0.31 0.08 1.97
Long debt/Assets 906,296 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.81
Sales/Assets 797,262 1.86 1.66 1.08 0.17 6.30
Cash/Assets 945,168 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.81
Fixed assets/Assets 995,472 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.93
Tan. assets/Assets 984,088 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.84
Notes: Lab. productivity is measured as a ratio of firm-level value added and number of employees. Employment
is measured as number of employees. Debt represents total debt of a company, including current and non-current
liabilities. Full sample covers 17 EU economies. CESEE includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. South Europe includes Italy, Portugal and Spain. West and North Europe
includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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CESEE region, with long-term debt reaching only 6% of total assets, on average in this region.
This proportion is more twice higher in the two other regions.
Finally, the asset composition also reveals interesting differences. Southern European com-
panies appear to be a bit shorter on cash, with cash to assets ratio at 11%. The two other
regions have stronger cash ratios between 17% and 18% of total assets, on average. While the
proportion of fixed assets seems to be rather consistent between regions, at around one-third of
total assets, CESEE corporate fixed assets consist predominantly of tangible assets. For refer-
ence, as much as one-third of fixed assets in Western and Northern Europe can be attributed
to intangible assets.
It is widely acknowledged that ORBIS data set, while not offering an unbiased sample of
European corporates (Gopinath et al., 2017), provide the most comprehensive and homogeneous
data set of firm levels data on which conduct analysis (Kalemli-Özcan et al., 2015). The records
happen to be gathered from somewhat larger firms, and there are coverage differences across
sectors and jurisdictions. To some extent, these characteristics are already reflected in Table 1.
While we recognize the ORBIS drawbacks, we believe that the data set we craft for the
analysis reproduces more than a fair degree of patterns in labour productivity dynamics. Fig-
ure 3 compares the annual labour productivity growth calculated using our dataset, and puts
it against the economy-wide benchmarks, as reported in Structural Business Statistics in Euro-
stat. More specifically, firm-level data are aggregated at 2-digit Nace Rev. 2 level and compared
against the same sectors in Eurostat.13 Sector level data are aggregated with time-invariant VA
weights, also taken from Eurostat.
While the amplitude of the annual changes is somewhat smaller in the sample than in the
economy-wide data (in particular after the crisis years 2009 and 2010 in Southern Europe and
Western-Northern Europe), clear patterns are visible. The correlation coefficients are 91%, 79%,
81% and 77%, for the entire data set, CESEE, Southern Europe and Western and Northern
Europe, respectively.
13Due to data availability in Eurostat, we are able to make this comparison on 2-digit level only. In the sample,
there are 33 2-digit manufacturing sectors, across EU17 countries.
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Figure 3: Annual labour productivity growth in broad regions over 2005-17.
Notes: Firm-level data are aggregated at 2-digit Nace Rev. 2 level and compared against the same sectors in
Eurostat. Sector level data are aggregated with time-invariant value added weights taken from Eurostat. See notes
to Table 1 for the composition of the regions.
4.2 Results of the OP decomposition
Firstly, we estimate the OP decomposition in the OLS framework, according to Eq. (3). In
particular, we estimate an equation:
ψ′isct = β0 + β1w̃isct + εisct, (8)
where ψ′ is the re-scaled labour productivity, w̃ is the standardized market share and ε is
an i.i.d error term. Dimensions i, s, c and t correspond to the firm, sector, country and
year, respectively. We use weighted least squares estimation, with weights πs determined by
the product of inverse sample weights n/(ns − 1) and sector-specific VA weights taken from
Eurostat. We aggregate the results by regions, according to dimension c.
Following Section 3, the covariance component of the OP productivity decomposition is
equivalent to the coefficient β̂1, whereas the trend productivity is a sector-rescaled coefficient
β̂0. While the results are estimated in levels, for better tractability we reformulate them in the
growth rates in Figure 4. The raw level results are given in Table B1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Drivers of aggregate productivity according to Olley-Pakes decomposition.
Notes: Sector grid corresponds to 4-digit Nace Rev. 2 classification. Sector-level results are aggregated with time-
invariant value added weights taken from Eurostat. Yearly level estimates are converted into annual growth rates
and averaged over respective time frames. See notes to Table 1 for the composition of the regions.
Several stylised facts emerge from the analysis. Firstly, looking at the overall sample, annual
productivity grew by 3.7 per cent on average between 2005 and 2007. It then collapsed to 0.1
per cent during the crisis years, with very muted recovery at 0.8 per cent in years 2011-13.
Productivity growth converged but did not reach pre-crisis levels throughout 2014-17, averaging
to around 2.8 per cent annually in this period.
Secondly, and interestingly, the allocative efficiency component contributed positively to
overall labour productivity growth throughout the entire period. Hence, over time, the European
corporate ecosystem seemed to have allocated resources more efficiently, with more productive
corporates absorbing more resources. The allocative efficiency contribution was strongest during
the period of the global financial crisis, which can be attributed to the cleansing effect of
recessions (Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Duval et al., 2019). Conversely, the contribution
of allocative efficiency to productivity growth was smallest in the following years, during the
sovereign debt crisis. The allocative component accounted for 26-27% of total productivity
growth, both in the years before the crisis and after 2014.
Thirdly, it must be pointed out that the crisis changed the composition of overall labour
productivity in terms of trend and covariance components. In level terms, 22% of labour
productivity in 2004 could have been attributed to allocative efficiency (see Table B1 in the
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Appendix). In 2017 it was already 26%. This change is important to keep in mind, as with
larger shares lower growth rates in covariance component can be overrepresented in the overall
growth rates. In fact, while the overall growth rate post 2014 was lower by a quarter compared
to the years 2005-07, the growth rate of covariance productivity component itself more than
halved throughout the period, from 5.6 per cent in 2005-07 to 2.7 per cent in 2014-17.
Beyond aggregate dynamics, the analysis also brings interesting insights regarding regional
differences. The CESEE region enjoyed the highest productivity growth throughout 2005-07 and
2014-17, reaching 7.4 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively. The crisis years took, however, their
toll. Productivity growth slowed down to 1.3 per cent in 2008-10, being exclusively supported
by the allocative efficiency component. Productivity then receded by 2.1 per cent during the
period of the sovereign debt crisis, in 2011-13, as trend component and allocation efficiency
declined. It is indeed the only occurrence in our study over which the allocative efficiency
contributed negatively to the overall productivity growth. While productivity growth bounced
back over the years 2014-17, it did not reach the pre-crisis levels. CESEE is also a region where
the role of allocative efficiency, in the levels of labour productivity, diminished from 40% in
2004, to 34% in 2017.
For the Southern Europe, at around 2.9 per cent per year, the pre-crisis productivity growth
was below the EU benchmark. It further collapsed during the crisis years, as the trend com-
ponent fell sharply and became negative. However, the allocative efficiency remained positive
during the entire period, also during the crises. In fact, the allocative efficiency played a substan-
tial positive role throughout the crisis. Despite the supportive role of the allocation efficiency,
the overall productivity growth stalled during the sovereign debt crisis. Over the most recent
period, productivity growth has rebounded however, slightly exceeding the pre-crisis pace.
Annual productivity growth, in the pre-crisis years, in West and North Europe reached on
average 4.7 per cent, with the covariance component accounting for 23% of this increase. While
productivity growth substantially slowed down during the crisis years, to 0.5 per cent a year,
and accelerated thereafter, it remains more than 1 percentage point below the pre-crisis levels
in the more recent period. The allocative efficiency component did not substantially contribute
to productivity growth during the period of the global financial crisis, nor during the sovereign
debt turbulence. It picked up marginally only in the most recent period. However, less than
one-fifth of the total level of labour productivity can be attributed to the covariance component,
which is less than in the two other regions.
While the share of allocative efficiency component in overall labour productivity level before
the crisis was limited to around 20%, on average, its supportive role during the recovery should
not be underestimated, especially in the CESEE and Southern European regions. Should the
allocative efficiency component grow at its pre-crisis pace in years 2014-17, the overall pro-
ductivity would grow faster by nearly 0.7 percentage points (3.4 per cent against actual of 2.7
per cent). To put it in level terms, should the covariance component in years 2014-17 grow at
the 2005-07, in 2017 labour productivity would have been higher by EUR 1,141 in the CESEE
region and by EUR 1,979 in Southern Europe.14
14The allocative productivity growth in 2014-17 in Western and Northern Europe was in this respect higher
than in pre-crisis years.
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5 Access to finance
5.1 Distribution of debt and allocative efficiency
We measure the contribution of firms’ indebtedness to the OP covariance productivity, condi-
tional on a set of observed characteristics, according to Eq. (6). Specifically, we estimate the
following two equations
ψ′′isct = α0 + α1
˜Levisct−1 + ΓQ̃isct−1 + εisct,
w′′isct = β0 + β1 ˜Levisct−1 + ∆Q̃isct−1 + νisct,
(9)
where ψ′′ is the re-scaled labour productivity, w′′ is the re-scaled market share, ˜Lev is the stan-
dardized indebtedness metrics (debt to asset ratio), and matrix Q̃ consists of control variables
including cash to asset ratio, sales to asset ratio, accounts payable to assets ratio and company’s
age (all in standard scores). The independent variables are taken in the first lags to alleviate at
least some of the endogeneity concerns. Variables ε and ν are the i.i.d error terms. Dimensions
i, s, c and t correspond to the firm, sector, country and year, respectively. We use the WLS
estimation, with weights πs determined by the product of inverse sample weights n/(ns − 1)
and sector specific value added weights taken from Eurostat.
According to Section 3, under exogeneity of ε and ν, the conditional contribution of leverage
to the component of the covariance productivity component is equivalent to the product of
coefficients α̂1× β̂1. The results are estimated in levels, but for better tractability we plot them
in the growth rates in Figure 5. The raw level results are given in Table B2 in the Appendix.15
Firstly, the results confirm the previous section observation that the covariance productivity
growth more than halved in the EU17 from 2005-07 to 2014-17.
Secondly, and more importantly, the role of firm-level financial leverage also evolved. Look-
ing at the EU17, access to finance contributed some 27% of the allocative productivity growth
before the crisis. During the financial crises, when banks were short on capital and rationed
credit, dependence on external finance was weighing on the within-sector resource allocation.
That could have been attributed to both productive firms being strapped of external finance,
but also to sustaining credit lines to less productive incumbent firms. In the after-crisis years,
the finance-driven allocative efficiency growth was muted. While it picked up marginally be-
tween in 2014-17, it never really recovered to the pre-crisis levels with the contribution being
nearly twice smaller at 14%.
Thirdly, the geographical breakdown reveals interesting patterns. Financial leverage has
never been a key driver for allocative efficiency growth in the CESEE region. For South Europe,
the benefits of the financial leverage on allocative efficiency growth in pre-crisis years were
completely offset during the subsequent crisis phase. It remained muted afterwards.
However, finance played a more nuanced role for the productivity growth in West and North
Europe. While the region actually observed a small improvement in allocative productivity
growth from 2.2 per cent in 2005-07 to 2.7 per cent in 2014-17, there role played by financial
leverage flipped. In the pre-crisis period, financial leverage was contributing 71% to the overall
15We also rerun the analysis on financial leverage net of cash holdings. As all the main conclusions still hold,
we skip their description in the text, however, the level results are presented in Table B3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Contribution of financial leverage to covariance productivity growth.
Notes: Control variables include lagged sales over total assets, cash over total assets, accounts payable over total
assets and company’s age. Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets and taken in period t− 1. Sector-
level results are aggregated with time-invariant value added weights taken from Eurostat. Yearly level estimates
are converted into annual growth rates and averaged over respective time frames. See notes to Table 1 for the
composition of the regions.
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efficiency growth. This contribution almost vanished during the two crisis episodes. The accel-
eration in the allocative efficiency in this region after 2014 was not resulting from a pronounced
rise in the contribution from the allocation of debt. Indeed, between 2014-17, the contribution
from financial leverage to allocative efficiency growth was below 10%.
Should the financial leverage component in years 2014-17 grow at the pre-crisis levels, the
allocative efficiency could have grown by 0.67 percentage points, and the overall labour pro-
ductivity by 0.18 percentage points faster. In level terms, labour productivity could have been
higher by roughly EUR 87 in CESEE, by EUR 512 in South Europe and by EUR 967 in West
and North Europe.16
The method does not allow us to adequately identify the within-sector relation between
debt and productivity. In other words, we can’t say if the problems associated with firm-level
external finance are related to too much or too little debt. In the next section, however, we shed
more light on this phenomenon on the example of Western and Northern Europe, as a region
that recorded the larger change in the contribution of financial factors to allocative efficiency
after the crises.
5.2 Debt and within-sector productivity
Under perfect allocative efficiency, few most productive firms would supply the market. This
does not materialise because (i) productive firms cannot expand and raise enough their market
share, or because (ii) less-productive firms manage to keep a market share well above its optimal
value (Aghion et al., 2004). Access to finance can play a role in both cases.
In the first example, productive firms can be at unsustainable levels of debt. It is often
referred to as a debt overhang problem, whereby excessive debt levels alter investment incentives
at the firm managerial level. In particular, managers may forego some profitable investment
projects, if they need to share a big portion of returns with debt holders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Should this happen among productive firms, the foregone opportunities may result in
lower growth prospects, and hence it can impede the aggregate productivity.
The second possibility is that productivity laggards receive extra life support from higher-
than-optimal debt levels. While it can happen for a variety of possibly non-financial reasons,
including state ownership for instance, we will put them in a joint category of ever-greening.
Ever-greening corresponds to a situation where a financial institution sustains credit lines to
firms without sufficient profit generating capacity (Peek and Rosengren, 2005). It happens typi-
cally in a heavily stressed or undercapitalized banking sector, where the short-term provisioning
costs exceed the long-term costs of ever-greening.
Last but not least, it can be that productive firms cannot get sufficient financing for their
investment projects. This problem, generally known as credit constraints, has been vastly stud-
ied throughout the literature. It is generally attributed to information asymmetries, which can
make private sector financial institutions unwilling to extend credit, especially uncollateralised
credit, to SMEs and mid-caps even at high interest rates (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and
16We arrive at these numbers by calculating the 2017 financial leverage component with a growth rate in each
of the years between 2014-17 replaced by the 2005-07 average. For the CESEE region, for instance, the average
growth rate in financial component was 9.7 per cent between 2005 and 2007, which gives is 0.659× (1 + 0.097)4−
0.868 = 0.086 (with more digit precision it is 0.087).
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Weiss, 1981). The result is credit rationing, i.e. an equilibrium where banks decide to keep the
supply of credit below demand, rather than to provide the extra loan demand at higher interest
rates. These three, rather stylized, cases are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: High/low debt as a drag on productivity growth.
Most productive firms Least productive firms
“Over” indebtedness Debt overhang Ever-greening
“Under” indebtedness Credit constraints -
In our methodology, we cannot uniquely identify the channel(s) that alter the contribution
of financial leverage to the allocative efficiency growth. However, we can approximate them
through stylized what-if scenarios, by estimating the model in Eq. (9) controlling for the firm-
level proxies of (i) debt overhang, (ii) ever-greening and (iii) credit constraints. While we
recognize that sole measuring of these factors can contribute a paper of its own, we focus on
three rule-of-thumb indicators which can be derived from firm-level financial statements.
More specifically, we tag firms as suffering from debt overhang problem if the interest cover-
age ratio was below 1 for three consecutive years (Ferrando and Wolski, 2018). We classify firms
as potentially benefiting from ever-greening if they had negative profits for three consecutive
years, yet they are still present on the market. While we cannot directly account for the bank-
firm relation in this respect, this proxy may be associated with a degree of firm’s zombiefication
and therefore it indirectly suggests that some of firm’s bad debt may be rolled over (Bank of
England, 2013). Lastly, we consider firms’ development to be hampered by financial constraints
if they have a low collateralization index, defined as the share of tangible to total assets being
in the first quartile of the within-sector distribution.17 The evolution of each of the groups over
time is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Corporate ecosystem composition in West and North Europe.
Debt overhang Ever-greening Credit constraints
2005-2007 15% 5% 25%
2008-2010 22% 7% 25%
2011-2013 23% 10% 24%
2014-2017 15% 7% 24%
Notes: Shares correspond to the average proportion of firms tagged as suffering from debt overhang problems,
benefiting from ever-greening and under credit constrains.
It can be readily observed that the firms assigned to either of the groups, do not constitute
more than a quarter of all firms, yet the proportions are comfortably above zero level to pro-
vide meaningful interpretation. While, by construction, the share of credit constrained firms
is set at one quarter, the debt overhang and ever-greening categories closely track the crisis
choreography. In particular, the interest coverage problems escalated throughout 2008-10 and
17It should be noted that one firm can belong to several groups. For instance, for the years 2011-13 about
a third of credit-constrained firms are also tagged as suffering from debt overhang and ever-greening. While it
blurs the lines between the channels, the general results still hold for firms which belong to one category only.
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remained elevated in the subsequent years, to then decrease to the pre-crisis levels after 2014.
The problems of profitability tracked this trend, with a clear peak in years 2011-13, highlighting
the difficulties among firms to boost profitability metrics even after the crisis. Broadly-speaking,
however, the post-2014 shares largely match the pre-crisis patterns.
We re-estimate Eq. (9) by adding an extra interaction variable, to the set of control variables
Q̃, for each of the three channels listed above. This extra control accounts for distributional
impact of financial leverage onto the allocative efficiency component, which can be attributed
to either debt overhang, ever-greening or financial constraints.18
The results are presented in Table 4 in columns (2), (3) and (4), respectively. Additionally,
the overall growth rate financial leverage contribution is presented for comparison in column
(1).19 The table should be read by comparing the numbers in columns (2)-(4) to the numbers
in column (1), such that higher numbers in columns (2)-(4) reflect that the presence of firms,
associated with a specific channel in the overall distribution of firms, hampered the covariance
productivity growth attributed to financial leverage.
Table 4: Financial leverage and covariance productivity growth in West and North Europe.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Fin. leverage No debt overhang No ever-greening No credit constraints
2005-2007 1.55%
2008-2010 -0.34% 0.79% 0.14% -1.60%
2011-2013 -0.56% -1.80% -1.26% 0.25%
2014-2017 0.26% 0.02% -0.02% 0.62%
Notes: Growth in financial leverage component of covariance productivity, estimated by controlling for distribu-
tional impact associated with debt overhang (column 2), ever-greening (3) and credit constrains (4). See the main
text for the proxies used to classify firms across the three potentially overlapping groups. The numbers reflect the
average annual growth rates in respective periods.
It can be readily observed that during the crisis years between 2008-10 the substantial slow-
down in allocative productivity growth could have been linked to the debt overhang problem.
In other words, if we take away from the overall covariance productivity the effects generated
by firms with excessive debt levels, the growth contribution would have jumped from -0.34 per
cent to 0.79 per cent.
After the crisis, credit constraints become more visible. While the covariance productivity
growth linked to financial leverage between 2011 and 2013 was -0.56 per cent, it would have
been 0.25 per cent (so even above the overall covariance productivity growth) if we control for
the distributional effects generated by firms with low collateral level.
This pattern is exacerbated in years 2014-17. Excluding the effects spanned by low-collateral
companies, the covariance productivity growth generated by financial leverage would have been
0.62 per cent, compared to 0.26 per cent when calculated over the entire distribution of firms.
In other words, should the distribution of firm-level productivity be independent from collateral
18For instance, for the debt overhang dummy D, the extra control is ˜Levisct−1 ×Disct−1.
19The numbers reported under the column (1) correspond to the blue bar, i.e. the growth in contribution of
financial leverage in Figure 5.
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levels, debt could have been more than twice more effective in spurring allocative efficiency
growth across West and North Europe between 2014-17.20
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of the paper is threefold. Firstly, we develop a formal framework to estimate the OP
productivity decomposition through a linear regression. The decomposition splits the sector-
wide productivity into two components. The first one describes the productivity level common
across all the firms in a sector. The second one is a covariance-like term, often associated
with allocative efficiency, which describes to what extent highly productive firms dominate in a
particular sector.
Our OLS framework is a one-equation elegant solution to estimate and aggregate the OP
decomposition for multiple-sectors economies. Our main attention is paid to the allocative
efficiency, for which we develop a formal approach to estimate the contribution of firm-level
confounding variables to the sector-wide aggregates.
Secondly, we take the methodology to the data and estimate the OP productivity decom-
position on a sample of manufacturing firms in the EU17 countries, using a comprehensive
unbalanced data set of around 672,000 firms, over the years 2004-17. We find that the al-
locative efficiency component contributed positively to the overall labour productivity growth
throughout the years. This contribution was strongest during the crisis years, which could be
attributed to the cleansing effect of the recession (Duval et al., 2019), and the smallest in the
years following the crisis.
While the contribution of allocative efficiency component to overall labour productivity level
before-crisis was limited to around one-fifth, on average, its role in the recovery should not be
underestimated, especially in the CESEE and Southern European regions. Should it had grown
at its pre-crisis pace in years 2014-17, the 2017 level of labour productivity would have been
higher by EUR 1,141 in the CESEE region and by EUR 1,979 in Southern Europe.
We then estimate the contribution of firm-level financial leverage to the growth in covariance
productivity component. On the EU sample, access to finance contributed some 27% to the
allocative productivity growth before the crisis and then collapsed during the crisis period. In
the after-crisis years the finance-driven allocative efficiency growth was muted. While it picked
up marginally between in 2014-17, it never really recovered to the pre-crisis levels with the
contribution being nearly twice smaller at 14%.
We further measure to what extent firm-level debt metrics contributed to the evolution of
the allocative efficiency over time. We find that Western and Northern Europe experienced a
major change in how the within-sector distribution of debt was associated with the allocative
efficiency growth after the financial crisis. Specifically, the share of leverage contribution to the
covariance productivity growth dropped from more than 70% in pre-crisis years to less than
10% in years 2014-17, on average.
20It needs to be pointed out that the fact that we don’t find similarly strong evidence in favour of debt
overhang or ever-greening problems, does not mean that they are insignificant factors for firm-level productivity.
The exercise should be rather viewed through a prism the within-sector distribution of productivity, but these
factors could have still hampered sector-wide trend productivity growth, for instance.
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In the last step of the analysis, we try to explain this change. In particular, we estimate
the contribution of financial leverage to the allocative efficiency component, controlling for the
distributional effects generated by the firms susceptible to either debt overhang, ever-greening
or financial constraints problems. We find that while during the crisis years, the allocative pro-
ductivity growth was mostly hampered by the debt overhang problem, after the crisis, the pro-
ductivity gains were locked in by financial constraints, as exemplified by our index of collateral
availability. Should the distribution of firm-level productivity be independent from collateral
levels, debt could have been more than twice more effective in spurring allocative efficiency
growth across West and North Europe between 2014-17.
The results offer interesting policy guidance. Firstly, we underline the relevance of distri-
butional aspects of aggregate productivity levels. While the sector-wide technology is, without
doubt, the dominant force behind production capacity, the role of allocative efficiency in the
growth rate should not be neglected. Policies which aim at improving the entry-exit processes,
like lower barriers to entry or more efficient bankruptcy regimes, are certainly desirable direc-
tions.
Secondly, the findings indicate that productive efficiency growth could have been muted, in
the recent years, by firms having problems with access to finance. The evidence points to a
conclusion that highly productive but low-collateral firms do not make sufficient use of available
external resources to increase their market shares. With this in mind, public intervention to
alleviate collateral-related financial constraints can bring impetus to more efficient allocation of
resources and, by extrapolation, can spur the overall productivity growth.
This study has a natural continuation in the dynamic OP decomposition, as proposed by
Melitz and Polanec (2015). While there is no clear-cut way to embed our OLS framework in
the dynamic OP specification, controlling for exit-entry rates could have offered more precise
estimates on the role of finance in the aggregate productivity growth. Similarly, to better track
the role of the financial sector, conditional on data availability, a possible extension could include
banking indicators, like capital or liquidity metrics.
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Kalemli-Özcan, S., Sørensen, B., Villegas-Sanchez, C., Volosovych, V., and Yesiltas, S. (2015).
How to construct nationally representative firm level data from the Orbis global database:
New facts and aggregate implications. NBER Working Paper, 21558.
Melitz, M. J. and Polanec, S. (2015). Dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition with
entry and exit. The RAND Journal of Economics, 46(2):362–375.
Nakamura, L., Samuels, J., and Soloveichik, R. (2017). Measuring the “free” digital economy
within the GDP and productivity accounts. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working
Papers, 37.
Olley, G. S. and Pakes, A. (1996). The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry. Econometrica, 64(6):1263–1297.
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E. S. (2005). Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misal-
location of credit in Japan. American Economic Review, 95(4):1144–1166.
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic
Review, 88:559–586.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review, 71(3):393–410.
28
A Technical appendix
Proposition 1 (Sectoral Productivity Estimation). Suppose the data consist of n observations
{ψi, wi}ni=1. Given the linear model specification of the form
ψ′i = β0 + β1w̃i + εi,
where ψ′i = ψi(n − 1)σw, σw is the standard deviation of w, w̃i is a standard score of wi and
εi is the i.i.d. disturbance, the decomposition in Eq. (1) can be rewritten in terms of Ordinary





Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the simple linear model of the form
yi = α0 + α1xi + εi,
where {yi, xi}ni=1 is the data sample and εi is the unobserved error component. The Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates minimize the sum of squared residuals ε̂i, where
ε̂i = yi − α0 − α1xi.
It is well known that the procedure offers a solution
α̂0 = ȳ − α̂1x̄, and α̂1 =
∑n
i=1 (yi − ȳ) (xi − x̄)∑n





Suppose we take the standard score x̃ of the x covariate, such that ¯̃x = 0 and var(x̃) = 1.
Suppose also that we set y′i ≡ yi × σx. It follows that for the model
y′i = β0 + β1x̃i + εi,
we get







Proposition 2 (General Productivity Estimation). Suppose the data consist of n observations
split into S partitions as {ψis, wis}nsi=1 with ns ≥ 1 and {s = 1, ..., S}. Given the linear model
specification of the form
ψ′is = β0 + β1w̃is + εis,
where ψ′is = ψis(ns − 1)σws, σws is the standard deviation of w within partition s, w̃is is a
standard score of wi within partition s and εis is the i.i.d. disturbance, the decomposition in











where weights are determined by the product of population weights πs and inverse sample weights
n/(ns − 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the population is partitioned according to an operator Z with
partitions given by Z1, ...,ZS , the population shares are given by
πs = P((y, x) ∈ Zs), s = 1, ..., S,
while the sample weights are given by
hs = (ns − 1)/n, s = 1, ..., S, and ns ≥ 2,
and the weight for unit i is given by
vis = πis/his, i = 1, ..., n.
Consider the simple linear model of the form
yi = α0 + α1xi + εi,
where {yi, xi}ni=1 = {{yis, xis}
ns
i=1}Ss=1 is the data sample and εis is the unobserved error com-



















It can be verified that
α̂0 = ȳv − α̂1x̄v, and α̂1 =
∑n
i=1 vi (yi − ȳv) (xi − x̄v)∑n
i=1 vi (xi − x̄v)
2
where the subscript v denotes the weighted mean.
Suppose we take the standard score x̃ of the x covariate for each partition, such that ¯̃xs = 0
and var(x̃s) = 1 for s = 1, ..., S. Suppose also that we set y
′
is ≡ yis× σxs . It follows that for the
model






































= E[ȳSσxS | S],
where superscript b stands for Bessel-corrected weight πbs = πs(ns− 1)/ns and we exploited the









is − ȳ′v) (x̃is − ¯̃xv)∑
s
∑




















= E[cov (yS , xS) |S],
(A1)
where we note that ¯̃xv = ¯̃xs = 0, and we exploited that if E[x] = 0 then E[y] doesn’t directly
affect the covariance level.
Proposition 3 (Sectoral Covariance Decomposition). Suppose the data consist of n obser-
vations {ψi, wi, z1i , ..., z
dZ
i }. Suppose there are dZ × 2 linear regression equations indexed by












































where ψ′′i = ψi
√
n− 1, w′′i = wi
√
n− 1, z̃ri is a standard score of zri , r = 1, ..., dZ , and εri is the
i.i.d. disturbance for r-th set of equations. Then, the covariance decomposition in Eq. (4) can
be rewritten as
(n− 1)cov(ψ,w) = (n− 1)E
[








Proof of Proposition 3. Before turning to the proof it is useful to remind the multivariate co-
variance decomposition. We take that Z is a dZ-dimensional vector of confounders, with dZ > 0
and r = 1, ..., dZ . By the law of total covariance we get that
cov(ψ,w) = E
[











In the proof we apply mathematical induction and switch to continuous domain for brevity.
Let’s take r = 1, and substitute the conditional expectations by the linear regressions E[ψ|Z̃1] =
31








cov(ψ,w|Z̃1 = z̃1)dP(Z̃ ≤ z̃) + cov(α10 + α11Z̃1, β10 + β11Z̃1)
=
∫








where we exploited that by design P(Z̃ ≤ z̃) = P(Z ≤ z).












In continuous setup the second term becomes∫












For the second term of r = m ≤ dZ expansion we get∫
...
∫
cov(E[ψ|Z1 = z1, ..., Zm−1 = zm−1, Zm],
E[w|Z1 = z1, ..., Zm−1 = zm−1, Zm])f(z̃1, ..., z̃m−1)dz̃1...dz̃m−1 = αmmβmm .
Proposition 4 (General Covariance Decomposition). Suppose the data consist of n observations




i=1 with ns ≥ 1 and {s = 1, ..., S}. Suppose there












































where ψ′′is = ψis
√
ns − 1, w′′is = wis
√
ns − 1, z̃ris is a standard score of zri , with r = 1, ..., dZ ,
within partition s, and εris is the i.i.d. disturbance for r-th set of equations. Then, the partition-
wise aggregation of decomposition in Eq. (4) can be rewritten as














































Firstly, we consider term A
A = E
[∫















where we exploited that by design P(Z̃s ≤ z̃s) = P(Zs ≤ zs) for s = 1, ..., S.
























































































By the steps proposed in the proof of Proposition 3 the setup can be extended to multivariate
Z̃ variable.
Note that the first term in the expansion of B is not weight invariant due to the different























To balance the relative importance between the α1s1 and β
1s
1 , when calculating the scaled version




Following Proposition 2, the regression equations can be estimated by the Weighted Least
Squares, where weights are determined by the product of population weights πs and inverse
sample weights n/(ns − 1).
Proposition 5 (Conditional General Covariance Decomposition). Suppose the data consist of








i=1 with ns ≥ 1 and
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where ψ′′is = ψis
√
ns − 1, w′′is = wis
√
ns − 1, q̃jis is a standard score of q
j
i , with j = 1, ..., dQ
within partition s, z̃ris is a standard score of z
r
i , with r = 1, ..., dZ within partition s, and
εris is the i.i.d. disturbance for r-th set of equations. Then, the partition-wise aggregation of
conditional covariance decomposition in Eq. (6) can be rewritten as




cov(ψ,w|Z1, ..., ZdZ )
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βrSr | Q = q, S
]
.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proof follows from steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 4.
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B Detailed results
Table B1: Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition.
Full Sample CESEE South Europe West-North Europe
Year Trend Covariance Trend Covariance Trend Covariance Trend Covariance
2004 52.49 15.02 13.77 9.04 53.38 18.75 55.71 10.57
(0.197) (0.418) (0.199) (0.808) (0.261) (0.684) (0.262) (0.653)
2005 54.08 15.33 14.54 8.35 54.34 18.17 58.26 12.23
(0.175) (0.399) (0.206) (0.564) (0.275) (0.623) (0.28) (0.677)
2006 55.49 16.72 16.10 10.15 54.81 19.64 60.99 13.33
(0.187) (0.43) (0.231) (0.669) (0.203) (0.543) (0.324) (0.871)
2007 58.10 17.10 17.59 10.53 57.74 20.71 63.26 12.71
(0.173) (0.393) (0.202) (0.892) (0.232) (0.52) (0.302) (0.666)
2008 56.56 18.21 17.80 11.14 56.21 22.99 61.52 12.21
(0.176) (0.472) (0.213) (1.062) (0.211) (0.651) (0.319) (0.743)
2009 53.10 18.57 16.60 9.99 51.16 23.75 60.05 12.19
(0.163) (0.535) (0.184) (0.56) (0.206) (0.759) (0.272) (0.717)
2010 55.83 19.36 17.47 11.53 53.24 24.45 63.93 13.03
(0.186) (0.52) (0.195) (0.809) (0.22) (0.678) (0.317) (0.719)
2011 56.02 19.55 16.94 9.95 52.16 25.43 66.00 12.28
(0.173) (0.424) (0.198) (0.565) (0.198) (0.626) (0.33) (0.651)
2012 55.94 20.41 17.45 10.67 50.95 26.47 67.45 12.91
(0.189) (0.386) (0.196) (0.616) (0.185) (0.555) (0.381) (0.765)
2013 56.60 20.39 16.57 10.53 51.76 26.32 68.10 13.08
(0.171) (0.413) (0.153) (0.557) (0.18) (0.577) (0.316) (0.846)
2014 58.58 21.35 17.62 11.10 53.42 27.76 70.63 13.41
(0.188) (0.408) (0.159) (0.637) (0.223) (0.609) (0.33) (0.669)
2015 60.42 22.62 19.39 11.32 54.15 29.19 74.05 14.58
(0.198) (0.45) (0.185) (0.74) (0.193) (0.605) (0.37) (0.759)
2016 61.41 22.38 20.58 11.17 55.94 29.31 73.90 13.81
(0.195) (0.446) (0.18) (0.674) (0.201) (0.549) (0.416) (0.678)
2017 63.13 22.67 22.18 11.45 57.89 29.32 75.30 14.50
(0.196) (0.431) (0.227) (0.739) (0.202) (0.677) (0.433) (0.696)
Notes: Numbers are calculated for each NACE 4-digit sector and aggregated according to time-invariant value
added weights for specific country groups. Bootstrapped standard errors from 100 replicas are given in parentheses
(significance codes skipped for transparency, all values significant at 0.001 level).
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Table B2: Financial leverage and allocative efficiency.
Full Sample CESEE South Europe West-North Europe
Year Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total
2005 1.31 15.33 0.67 8.35 1.20 18.17 0.72 12.23
(0.11) (0.439) (0.099) (0.585) (0.154) (0.744) (0.14) (0.788)
2006 1.89 16.72 0.86 10.15 2.05 19.64 1.01 13.33
(0.143) (0.543) (0.098) (0.73) (0.208) (0.619) (0.163) (0.968)
2007 1.77 17.10 0.77 10.53 1.68 20.71 1.11 12.71
(0.121) (0.446) (0.09) (0.797) (0.14) (0.577) (0.165) (0.714)
2008 1.56 18.21 0.99 11.14 1.52 22.99 1.02 12.21
(0.109) (0.515) (0.127) (1.038) (0.167) (0.687) (0.157) (0.881)
2009 0.65 18.57 0.61 9.99 0.41 23.75 0.82 12.19
(0.073) (0.524) (0.118) (0.794) (0.079) (0.646) (0.168) (0.85)
2010 0.95 19.36 0.62 11.53 0.69 24.45 0.98 13.03
(0.093) (0.485) (0.138) (1.171) (0.096) (0.554) (0.193) (0.813)
2011 1.01 19.55 0.79 9.95 0.67 25.43 0.97 12.28
(0.091) (0.444) (0.154) (0.453) (0.102) (0.644) (0.171) (0.915)
2012 0.99 20.41 0.65 10.67 0.63 26.47 0.83 12.91
(0.087) (0.419) (0.129) (0.6) (0.097) (0.566) (0.177) (0.946)
2013 0.93 20.39 0.66 10.53 0.65 26.32 0.77 13.08
(0.093) (0.508) (0.135) (0.549) (0.092) (0.607) (0.153) (0.776)
2014 1.02 21.35 0.66 11.10 0.74 27.76 0.79 13.41
(0.096) (0.462) (0.152) (0.553) (0.123) (0.656) (0.17) (0.69)
2015 1.14 22.62 0.78 11.32 0.94 29.19 0.80 14.58
(0.112) (0.515) (0.178) (0.759) (0.121) (0.608) (0.203) (0.903)
2016 1.12 22.38 1.03 11.17 0.93 29.31 0.66 13.81
(0.113) (0.496) (0.144) (0.6) (0.129) (0.572) (0.165) (0.844)
2017 1.25 22.67 0.87 11.45 1.13 29.32 0.91 14.50
(0.116) (0.451) (0.174) (0.608) (0.119) (0.629) (0.174) (0.862)
Notes: Contribution of financial leverage to covariance productivity component (Column Leverage), conditional
on the level of cash to total assets, sales to total assets, trade payables to total assets and firms’ age (all in
t − 1). Financial leverage is calculated as a sum of current and non-current liabilities to total assets and taken
in t− 1. For comparison, the total covariance component is given according to Olley and Pakes (1996). Numbers
are calculated for each NACE 4-digit sector and aggregated according to time-invariant value added weights for
specific country groups. Bootstrapped standard errors from 100 replicas are given in parentheses (significance
codes skipped for transparency, all values significant at 0.001 level).
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Table B3: Net financial leverage and allocative efficiency.
Full Sample CESEE South Europe West-North Europe
Year Net Lev. Total Net Lev. Total Net Lev. Total Net Lev. Total
2005 1.88 15.33 0.80 8.35 1.70 18.17 1.27 12.23
(0.154) (0.499) (0.121) (0.605) (0.19) (0.838) (0.257) (0.833)
2006 2.77 16.72 1.03 10.15 2.88 19.64 1.63 13.33
(0.225) (0.52) (0.113) (0.701) (0.299) (0.649) (0.223) (1.132)
2007 2.58 17.10 0.95 10.53 2.37 20.71 1.87 12.71
(0.189) (0.438) (0.118) (0.851) (0.209) (0.546) (0.231) (0.695)
2008 2.31 18.21 1.35 11.14 2.14 22.99 1.74 12.21
(0.173) (0.518) (0.193) (1.184) (0.237) (0.691) (0.243) (0.814)
2009 0.92 18.57 0.86 9.99 0.59 23.75 1.50 12.19
(0.109) (0.601) (0.129) (0.746) (0.116) (0.742) (0.307) (0.842)
2010 1.31 19.36 0.92 11.53 0.97 24.45 1.68 13.03
(0.128) (0.512) (0.202) (1.069) (0.136) (0.665) (0.325) (0.873)
2011 1.40 19.55 1.19 9.95 0.95 25.43 1.48 12.28
(0.128) (0.419) (0.203) (0.486) (0.138) (0.585) (0.288) (0.736)
2012 1.40 20.41 1.06 10.67 0.92 26.47 1.31 12.91
(0.132) (0.495) (0.183) (0.58) (0.123) (0.693) (0.351) (0.876)
2013 1.31 20.39 1.05 10.53 0.95 26.32 1.20 13.08
(0.141) (0.412) (0.175) (0.571) (0.139) (0.586) (0.285) (0.819)
2014 1.52 21.35 1.09 11.10 1.11 27.76 1.38 13.41
(0.125) (0.479) (0.221) (0.515) (0.154) (0.647) (0.277) (0.768)
2015 1.69 22.62 1.27 11.32 1.39 29.19 1.29 14.58
(0.14) (0.549) (0.21) (0.707) (0.162) (0.584) (0.338) (0.835)
2016 1.76 22.38 1.71 11.17 1.46 29.31 1.15 13.81
(0.141) (0.47) (0.209) (0.582) (0.188) (0.711) (0.234) (0.885)
2017 2.00 22.67 1.54 11.45 1.77 29.32 1.49 14.50
(0.171) (0.499) (0.264) (0.722) (0.207) (0.631) (0.273) (0.77)
Notes: Contribution of net financial leverage to covariance productivity component (Column Net Lev.), conditional
on the level of cash to total assets, sales to total assets, trade payables to total assets and firms’ age (all in t− 1).
Net financial leverage is calculated as a sum of current and non-current liabilities, minus the cash holdings, to
total assets and taken in t− 1. For comparison, the total covariance component is given according to Olley and
Pakes (1996). Numbers are calculated for each NACE 4-digit sector and aggregated according to time-invariant
value added weights for specific country groups. Bootstrapped standard errors from 100 replicas are given in
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